In 1933 V.T. Thayer, the director of the Ethical Culture schools, signed the Humanist Manifesto. This fact was kept from Felix Adler, the founder of Ethical Culture, who was near death at the time, as it was believed that this news would have been too acrimonious for Adler and would have pushed the frail old man over the edge. You see, Felix Adler, the great moral champion who founded the Ethical Culture religion in 1876, was a neo-Kantian Idealist. He was opposed to Humanism for two principle reasons; first, because the term itself at that time was more commonly associated with Auguste Comte's (kawnt) curiously positivistic and ritualistic "Religion of Humanity." But more troublesome for dear old Adler was the creeping specter of pragmatic and naturalistic beliefs that were being espoused by some humanists such as John Dewey, who also signed the Humanist Manifesto.
Adler was fearful that the foundation of human worth upon which he had constructed his whole moral philosophy, would collapse on the loose shifting sands of a pragmatism that eschewed certainty.
The Ethical Culture statement of purpose defines the Movement as follows;
Ethical Culture is a humanistic religious and educational movement inspired by the ideal that the supreme aim of human life is working to create a more humane society. Our faith is in the capacity and responsibility of human beings to act in their personal relationships and in the larger community to help create a better world. Our commitment is to the worth and dignity of the individual and to treating each human being so as to bring out the best in him or her. Members join together in ethical societies to assist each other in developing ethical ideas and ideals... to celebrate life's joys and support each other through life's crises...to work together to improve our world and the world of our children.
Ethical Culture remains a tiny religious movement of about 3000 people in the United States with 23 congregations and fellowships. Despite its small size the Movement has a highly impressive history of building institutions and social organizations. The statement of purpose for the Movement underscores the principle concern for Ethical Culturists. What is human worth and how can we tell if that worth is being violated? Adler's original formulation of worth, which he demanded no creedal adherence to, was that the reality producing functions of the mind were capable of discerning the transcendent organicity of the cosmos of which human worth was an important component. A neo-Kantian but never a supernaturalist, Adler believed that what was required, was for humans to act in such a way so as to elicit the moral best from each other. As we elicit the ethical best, principally by affirming the moral uniqueness of the individual, the multiplicity of human insight would lead us to uncover the deeper basis for the affirmation of human worth.
Needless-to-say Adler's idealism did not find much support in America. Most Americans and including many Ethical Culturists, were gravitating towards, among others, the pragmatism of William James and John Dewey. Ethical Culturists, operating on the assumption of a "grounded" human worth, continued to explore the human condition and to champion a progressive social democracy. But Adler's fears concerning an unquestionable foundation for human worth as a basis for ethics always remained as an unresolved question.
As pragmatism developed it wrestled with the "cash-value" of ideas and pondered whether or not what worked was necessarily "good." Critics of pragmatism focused significantly on the moral dilemma that what worked for the individual might not do so for the community. Is the "good" only a fleeting assumption and if so, how can worth be maintained as sacred and inviolable? Much of pragmatic naturalism had been grounded on a scientific analysis of human nature. This was challenged by G.E. Moore's insistence that a concept of good cannot in anyway be defined in term's of any "natural" quality, echoing Hume's dictum that "no is implies an ought." Proponents of pragmatism countered that Moore's criticism is faulty because it assumes that an implicit definition of the "good" does indeed exist, and that "the so-called naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy by definition."1
The debate continues. Two principle questions arise at this point; do we really need a grounding for worth in order to have a meaningful ethic, and if so, how can we affirm worth beyond a subjective principle of utility? Much of secular humanism operated on the pretext that a grounding for worth was an artifact of history and asserted that as long as democracy and the community of inquiry prevailed, humans could build a coherent system of ethics. Paul Kurz, in his book Philosophical Essays in Pragmatic Naturalism, argues that naturalists can define value in terms of human behavior. The problem, of course, is that this requires that we are capable of defining what is human nature? Critics of this approach point out many obstacles. The first of course is the challenge raised by Darwin that as humans have evolved, our "nature" has shifted as well. The Humanists responded that modern evolutionary biologists have demonstrated, that for all intents and purposes natural selection for humans has ended, since humans compensate for much of the natural processes. Writers such as James Q. Wilson in his book "The Moral Sense" and Robert Wright in "The Moral Animal" argue that we can develop an evolutionary psychology of the species which will help us to understand our system of value.
Behaviorist psychologists who stressed the role of conditioning to explain human actions and who downplayed the immutability of biological forms had leveled another critique of the human nature theory. They argued that if conditions changed, what constitutes the good would also change. Yet, a purely behaviorist theory for explaining human action has been refuted by naturalists such as Noam Chomsky whose analysis of language development in children contradicts the claim that we learn solely through conditioned response. In addition, developments within the psychodynamic tradition also revealed that, regardless of the environment, certain psychic structures will emerge.
Interestingly enough, the biggest critique of the human nature argument would seem to come principally from some pragmatists. Human nature, it appears is a process of humans developing and being influenced by what we have created and decreed to be true. We are, however, capable of formulating new ideas and ideals that change our pattern of behavior. Of course, not all pragmatic naturalists would agree with this generalization, since our biology does seem to dictate and limit the pattern of our ideas.
Where did all of this leave Ethical Culture in the mid to late 20st century with its insistence upon a grounding for worth as the basis for ethics? The exploration continued, as did the debate concerning the need for such a basis. The question of finding some sort of objective test for human worth would certainly seem to have arisen within the shadow of the human need for certainty (as Dewey so eloquently explored) and perhaps such questions are only possible in a Western culture formally steeped in absolutism.
A desire for a grounded worth might indeed be an artifact of history. Dewey wrote that the quest for certainty in a world of transience drove humans to search for a ground of being in a realm which does not change. The Greeks and specifically Plato formulated a view of realty based on a notion of unchanging ideals. Plato changed the nature of the argument further by positing that the being behind change which does not change was both holy and good, adding a further value statement into the equation. Augustine argued that humans were limited in ultimately reaching this realm through the power of reason because of our original sin and the impact that this has on human will. Thus, only through the intervention of divine grace can that will be redirected.
John Calvin stressed the ultimate depravity of humankind, but did believe that a partial knowledge of God could be received through divine revelation with the Bible as source for this revelation. He downplayed however, any knowledge gained through this corrupt world of the flesh. Calvinist influenced theologians further stressed that the so-called works of humans were for naught, and that focusing on this world was evil and would only serve to lead us away from the truth. Thus, Dewey argues what we call "practical knowledge" arising from the realm of action and experience has been unfairly discriminated against, by the belief that it is inferior and will only lead us nowhere. This all hinged, he predicated, on a need for certainty to afford humans at least the impression of security.
The need for certainty and meaningfulness does have an existentialistic ring to it as well and some Ethical Culturists were influenced by the existentialist response to these problems. Writing years before Satre, Felix Adler argued that there were three spiritual pains that all humans must answer; what is the meaning of life and do I have worth in that scheme, how can I address the problem of suffering, and how do I avoid the divided conscience and live a life consistent with my values?
Many other modern writers with an existentialist bent seemed to echo this list. Victor Frankl in Man's Search for Meaning emphasized our innate need to live in a world of meaning. Having endured the hellish environment of the concentration camp, Frankl noted that individuals who had lost all meaning in their life were incapable of surviving much longer. He constructed a logotherapy that helped individuals to recreate a world of meaning once life's circumstances had destroyed the original constructs. Taking a cue from the page of existentialism, many religious humanists sought grounding for worth through the challenge of defining human essence.
Like existentialists such as Martin Buber, what distinguished the Ethical Culture attempt to approach the problem of essence was the source used to address the spiritual pains. To counteract the alienating mood within existentialism, some Ethical Culturists re-emphasized the radical way of encountering the "other" as originally formulated by Felix Adler. Expanding upon Kant, Adler believed there were indeed limits to human ability to solely reason a way to meaning and worth. Adler was likewise skeptical of the claims put forth by traditional revealed religion. He also eschewed attempts by some to discover answers to the spiritual pains by turning inward, since he did not believe an understanding of humanity could be revealed by locking oneself in a closet away from human experience. For Adler, the principle source for uncovering both meaning and worth was through moral engagement with others. His humanism was founded on the belief that each of us do indeed perceive part of the truth by virtue of our own unique moral experiences and it was the process of finding that spiritual gem embedded within each of us that the greater picture of the whole can be revealed.
Although Adler never put it this way, I like to use the parable of the six blind men who encounter the elephant in order to explain what Adler was describing using philosophical rhetoric. As each of the blind men encounter the elephant, each of them describes their experience differently. Thus, some feel the elephant is like a wall, like a tree trunk, like a rope, etc. In reality of course, there are aspects of an elephant that are like a wall, tree trunk and a rope. However, collectively, the elephant is more than these things. What the blind men failed to believe was that the insights being reported by others, even if they conflicted with our own experience, did indeed indicate a much larger truth.
If you place the human condition at the center of this parable, our spiritual pains as the filter by which we judge our experiences, and our need for certainty as the compelling force for closing the door on diverse opinions, you can arrive pretty much at a neo-Adlerian assessment of history. Basically, as diverse groups sought to answer the spiritual questions that plague all of us, disagreements arose over the analysis of our experiences. Since we seem driven towards certainty, conflicts naturally arose. We are left either with an attempt to persuade or compel others to see it our own way, or the drive to isolate ourselves within groups of individuals whom all seem to agree, at least on a superficial level, to a common explanation of experience. The Ethical Culture process of affirming the worth of the other in all radical forms was an attempt to prevent this form of "bad faith." By focusing on the strict need for authentic reciprocity within the relationship, we could possibly uncover the essence of the human proposition.
Although this parable is seemingly helpful in addressing some of the concerns regarding why there might be various explanations for human worth, it did not completely answer the question for some, does the elephant in the center of the experience truly exist? Are we indeed all touching upon the same aspects of life even if our experiences differ, and how would we know if the insights provided by another are correct or misguided? Can we discern a grounding for worth without at least a basic assumption that worth exists, contrary to most forms of existentialism? We seemed back again at square one.
What some argued through an analysis of language, is that this question, which is framed in such a way as to demand an objective certainty, is perhaps itself incorrect. There is an aphorism, attributed to Stephen Hawkings, that if you fail over and over again to arrive at a suitable answer to a problem, maybe this is an indication you're merely asking the wrong question. Some argue that the emphasis shouldn't be whether an answer for human worth sounds logical and reasonable, since the objectification of subjective responses in effects distorts the discussion. I draw here upon the work of feminist philosophers.
When Lawrence Kohlberg was developing his theories of moral development in children he argued that children often reported that a higher level of moral reasoning felt right even if they couldn't come up with a reasonable explanation as to why they believed this to be so. Yet Kohlberg continued to argue that an ability to arrive at abstract principles was the hallmark of advanced moral thinking. Carol Gilligan challenged Kohlberg's assumptions that disembodied values were more ethically advanced than relationships. What Gilligan underscored in her book In a Different Voice was that little girls emphasized concrete relationships over abstract principles. Nel Noddings delved farther into this in her book called Caring. She stressed the role of fostering relationships as a means for developing a feeling for moral reasoning. Perhaps, then an ethic should proceed less from a disinterested and disembodied mode of reasoning and towards an ethic that emerges out of a caring response.
The neurophysicist Antonio Damasio in his book, The Feeling of What Happens, would seem to concur, and he may be able to provide a neural basis for an ethic based on caring. His research reveals that individuals who have suffered frontal lobe damage and who have lost some of their capacity for emotions also show significant deficits in their ability to reason. Even though they can solve complicated puzzles, they often make poor life choices. Damasio argues that it would appear that, in some respects, our ability to reason is highly dependent on being in touch with our emotions. An Ethic of caring is based upon feelings which arise principally in our relationships.
All of these philosophers and researchers seem to indicate that if we were to stress an objectified non-emotional basis for human worth, we have for all intents and purposes closed off possible insights into the human condition. But it is more than just being emotionally grounded. Although we need to be in contact with our emotions for helping us to discern what is the right way to be, those emotional responses would also appear to arise principally through the relationships we establish with others.
This would seem to echo the ideas of the humanist psychologist Erich Fromme as well who argued that in order for humans to truly to consent to an idea intellectually, it must first be embedded within our emotional matrix.
While I agree with all the above, you see that once again we have returned to trying to define a human nature in order to discover a basis for human worth. Where shall we go from here? Religious humanists agree that many of the problems in this world are precisely because we have torn apart our communities of close relationships in order to foster a misaligned individualism. The results are communities devastated by high crime, dysfunctional families and a polluted environment. We have placed the "me" before the "us" with devastating consequences. And herein lies the Ethical Culture response. We need more than just caring communities. Part of the problem is that the benefits of community, if not tempered by an ethical mandate towards inclusiveness, will only serve to perpetuate the problems of our culture.
Although relationship and community building can lead to moral insights that does not necessarily mean that the affirmation of worth will emerge through this process alone. When we build exclusive rather than inclusive communities, we perpetuate many of the conditions that lead to the breakdown of large communities with diverse populations that we are witnessing today. We have to learn to temper our desire for privileged community by knowing that authentic community must be built on foundations beyond class, color, and the usual ways in which we humans differentiate ourselves.
The problem is, of course, that building this kind of diverse community is much more difficult. We often want to be with our own kind. Research has revealed that although many simian species are indeed communitarian, that community will often breakdown once it goes over 150 members. Michael Shermer, author and publisher of Skeptic magazine has gathered data that suggests we may be innately tribal as well. Are there limits to the amount of people we can care for? It's possible that part of the problem is that we feel that we loose our distinctiveness and uniqueness in a sea of humanity, a preconceived condition for worth. People don't know our names, and our feelings often get overlooked in order to accommodate the needs of the much larger community filled with members each clamoring to be understood and heard. Our spiritual pains get amplified. When this happens, we naturally want to gravitate towards a smaller clique. Sadly, over time, this can lead to isolationism and exclusion as we become more estranged from "other groups" that have fostered traditions alien to our own.
So where does all of this leave us? The grounding of worth still remains illusive. An objectified grounding for worth seems impractical and indeed probably is an artifact of history. Even the process of attempting to objectify human worth, as Nel Noddings and Beverly Harrison argued, probably does change the nature of the argument and lead us astray in our search. The old ghosts of Nominalism haunt us as well.
Yet the "subjective appropriation of objective uncertainties with passionate inwardness" seems also fraught with problems. Subjective experiences gathered through relationships must be tempered with an ethical mandate to be inclusive rather than exclusive. Yet that mandate begs a moral footing. Is such a moral footing possible, and more interestingly, is such a question merely a byproduct once again of a western culture formally built on absolutism. We may be left then, with nothing more than a process, yet the process does afford us some hope and validation, since human beings themselves seem to be perpetually in process both individually and collectively. I believe that the Ethical Culture emphasis on seeking the worth of the other during that process a goal worthy of our pursuit. Maybe, it just feels right to me after all. Or maybe it's just a statement of faith to which we humanists have now arrived. In either case, after 124 years Ethical Religion has just as many questions as answers....but after all, paradox appears to be the hallmark of the human experience, and maybe, the question is greater than the answer after all.
The greatest "sin" of the blind men in the Hindu parable is that they did not believe that others were capable of discovering real insights and revelations about this universe simply through diverse human experience, and that collectively we can arrive at a practical this-worldly truth, which means ultimately, they did not believe in themselves.
(An insight into why relationships are so important may be indicated by studies concerning the health benefits of prayer. One such study was performed in Israel by J. Kark and his researchers using epidemiological data of religious and secular kibbutzim. Certainly these groups share similar patterns of healthy living, yet after an extensive 17 year study, and correcting for all confounding variables, it was found that religious kibbutzim have significantly less health problems than do the secular kibbutzim, (although the secular kibbutzim had significantly better health than the average Israeli.) Dr. Mark Banshick of Hebrew Union College, after reviewing similar studies around the world, revealed that religious communities do appear to have the best health of all, something the secular press seems to have picked up on. Why is that?
He suggests that one aspect that religious communities have which secular groups do not is that religious communities frequently gather for prayer. Despite being orthodox and highly spiritual man, Dr. Banschick did not want to attribute a magical explanation as to why prayer seemed to help. Unlike reptiles, we humans as a species are born totally dependent upon others, not only for our physical needs but our psychodynamics needs as well. We discover who and what we are through a process of integrating and differentiating from the loving other.
His research on prayer revealed that in some forms the individual is encourage to regress back into a childlike state if only for a moment. We need opportunities to become a small, needy child again, to recognize that sometimes the problems are too big for one person to handle, and to offer these up to the great loving cosmic parent. These brief moments of respite are avenues for healing and transformation. As with psychotherapy, we often need these periods of regression before a "non-anxious presence in order to allow for personal transformation to occur.
Banschick writes that prayer is a form of self talking, that allows the individual to further reduce the stress of the human condition and to order and make sense out of our existence. Extensive research has revealed that Mark Banschick is probably correct. Dr. Carlson and his group of researchers have found that as people engaged in devotional meditation their heart rates and blood pressures lowered, and their auto immune system responded better. It is worth pointing out that a similar effect was found for meditation, but not to the significant levels as seen during traditional prayer. It has been suggested that the regression effect is greater when people believe they are in the presence of a loving spirit, a good parent if you will. Meditation lacks this quality. When we feel that we are being loved and that we are "heard" our ability to regress is enhanced and the health benefits are enhanced. Dr. Banschick also believes that our infantile separation anxieties which adults also carry are met when we engage a "powerful" other who can transcend time and space and come to us in our hour of need and loneliness
Although he is coming from a psychodynamic model, if Banschick is correct, we need opportunities for regression in the presence of another not only to feel loved and supported, but also to become re-centered. This affords us opportunities for religious transformation if we are challenged to grow while we are in that state. As a humanist I am happy to report that similar health and transformational benefits can be achieved in a secular setting as well, since support groups reveal the same health statistics as do prayer groups. The long and short of all of this is that we not only need our feelings in order to grow morally, we also need the experience of a caring relationship as well.)
1 Kurz, Paul. Philosophical Essays in Pragmatic Naturalism. (page 125).